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Articles
THE RAMSHACKLE EDIFICE: LIMITATIONS PERIODS
FOR PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER RULE 1OB-5
Allison Dabbs Garrett
Despite the forty-year history of applying state fraud or Blue Sky limitation
periods to the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5, this area of the
law is in a state of upheaval. In 1987, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, based upon recent Supreme Court cases, a limitation period should be
drawn from the federal securities laws. The Third Circuit applied a limitation
period that provides that certain express causes of action must be brought
within one year of the date of discovery, but in no event more than three years
after the date of the transaction to the 10b-5 claim of private litigants. No
other courts of appeals have followed the Third Circuit's lead at this time,
although many courts have expressed a desire for guidance from Congress or
the Supreme Court regarding the appropriate limitation period. Although ap-
plication of a federal limitation period is desirable, Congress's enactment of
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, which con-
tains a five-year limitation period, makes it unclear whether one-year/three-
year limitation provisions applied by the Third Circuit or the five-year limita-
tion provision contained in the Act should be applied to private actions under
Rule lOb-5.
CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACTIONS: LEGISLATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS AND JUDICIAL
SIDE EFFECTS
David E. Seidelson 41
In the middle and late 1970's, a number of state legislatures, reacting to what
they perceived to be a medical malpractice "crisis," enacted statutes intended
to assure the continuity of affordable medical care. Some of the statutes im-
posed a ceiling on the damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions.
Some created arbitration panels for such actions. Some abrogated the collat-
eral source rule in such actions, and some required plaintiff's counsel to file an
affidavit asserting that a qualified expert had reviewed the case and concluded
that there had been a deviation from the appropriate standard of care. Some
state legislatures apparently taking a more benign view of the alleged crisis,
enacted no such statutes. When a plaintiff domiciled in a state having no such
statute brings a medical malpractice action against a defendant who practices
in a state having such a statute, the court is likely to confront a choice-of-law
problem. This article examines the manner in which courts have been resolving
such problems, and suggests an appropriate methodology for their resolution.
POLICY FACTS AND INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP
UNDER ESTATE TAX SECTION 2042(2): THE LEGACY
OF Rhode Island Hospital Trust
Richard L. Haight 109
This article focuses on Internal Revenue Code Section 2042(2), an Estate Tax
provision which includes life insurance proceeds in the gross estate of an indi-
vidual who dies possessing an "incident of ownership" in the policy. In the
often cited United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, 355 F.2d
7 (1st Cir. 1966), the Court of Appeals emphasized the pre-eminent role of
"policy facts" (the terms of the contract of life insurance) in the determination
of whether a decedent holds such an incident. There has been some confusion
in the subsequent cases as to the degree to which it is permissible to look to
factors beyond the terms of a life insurance policy to resolve questions of in-
cludability under section 2042(2). This article examines the treatment of
outside factors in the decided cases, and demonstrates how results can vary
depending on the nature of a particular factor and the effect that it has on the
policy terms, i.e., whether the outside factor would effectively add a provision
to, or delete a provision from, the contract of insurance. The author seeks to
find order in the inconsistent case law and suggests a rational approach for
dealing with the issue in the future.
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